ABSTRACT: We work with a panel of bilateral trade flows from 1988 to 2002, exploring the influence of infrastructure, institutional quality, colonial and geographic context, and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral trade. We are interested in threshold effects, and so emphasize those cases where bilateral country pairs do not actually trade. We depart from the institutions and infrastructure literature in this respect, using Heckman selection model-based gravity estimators of trade flows. We also depart from this literature by mixing principal components (to condense our institutional and infrastructure measures) with a focus on deviations from expected values for given income cohorts to control for multicollinearity. Infrastructure, and institutional quality, are significant determinants not only of export levels, but also of the likelihood exports will take place at all. Our results support the notion that export performance, and the propensity to take part in the trading system at all, depends on institutional quality and access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure. Indeed, this dependence is far more important, empirically, than variations in tariffs in explaining sample variations in North-South trade. This implies that policy emphasis on developing country market access, instead of support for trade facilitation, may be misplaced.
Introduction
If trade matters, what can we then say about the countries that do not trade?
Many countries in Africa, for example, are consistent underperformers. While "globalizers," as defined by Dollar and Kraay (2004) , appear to be catching up with the OECD, the countries that are not are falling further behind, in both trade and growth terms. This begs the obvious question "why?" Why do they not trade, or why do they trade less relative to the recent set of globalizers? The issues involved are important ones. To address them, negotiators within the World Trade Organization have been given a "leave no country behind" mandate focused on integration of developing countries into the trading system. Emphasis has been placed on North-South tariffs, and there has been a massive mobilization of institutional resources (political, fiscal, legal and research-based) focused on trade promotion through liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The underlying magnitudes are highly relevant, as the mobilization of resources focused on trade policy, in a world of limited institutional resources, implies shifting away resources from other possible priority issues, like institutional development and improvements to basic infrastructure.
The renewed emphasis on growth through trade follows a tumultuous period of shifting perceptions on the role of trade in the empirical literature. Outward oriented policies emerged as a consensus growth prescription in the 1980s. This consensus was backed by cross-country studies of openness and growth. A pioneering attempt to classify trade regimes was conducted in an NBER study directed by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) . The common message carried from this work was that the degree of openness of the trade regime was positively correlated with export growth, which was in turn positively correlated with real GDP growth. A second large-scale attempt to classify countries by trade orientation was conducted by the World Bank (1987) , reaching the same broad conclusion. What followed was a flood of cross-country empirical research linking trade to growth, and broadly supporting the paradigm view.
The consensus view was challenged in important papers by Edwards (1993) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) . The criticisms went to the foundations of the prior body of research, and were directed at the conclusions one can safely draw from cross-country studies. Rodriguez and Rodrik argued that we should not be comforted, but rather worried, by the apparent ability of highly disparate measures to capture the "same" relationship between openness and growth. Edwards argued that the basic approach to cross-country studies abstracted away from important factors better identified through studies of historical episodes. On the basis of such longer-term historical experience, both the Edwards and Rodriguez and Rodrik papers concluded that the role of trade had been overblown. However, the result has not been a paradigm shift, but rather more careful econometrics. As the dust settles, trade remains standing as a focus of attention.
The more recent body of work on export performance and economic growth has internalized earlier criticisms, and emphasis is now on the role of institutions and the record of experience within individual countries. Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that institutional quality is highly correlated with trade itself. They therefore focus on decadal changes in growth instrumented on changes in trade and institutions, and interpret their results as meaning that institutions and trade both matter in the long-run, while trade growth offers short-term advantages over insti-tutional improvements for fostering growth. In another paper, Dollar and Kraay (2004) examine episodes of liberalization, concluding that for individual countries that underwent recent trade liberalization episodes, expansion of trade translates into rising incomes and falling poverty rates. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) also focus on liberalization episodes, and also conclude that trade growth is linked robustly to growth and investment. Greenaway et al (2002) address a different criticism of Edwards and Rodriguez and Rodrik, linked to fundamental problems with the openness indicators used in the cross-country literature. They work with a dynamic panel and three openness indicators, finding that the trade openness relationship is robust to the earlier criticisms. Finally, while Rodrik et al (2004) do not find a direct impact of trade on incomes, they do find a more complex relationship between institutions, integration, and growth. Institutions can promote integration, while integration also has a (positive) impact on institutional quality.
As they find institutions important for incomes, this suggests that trade can have an indirect effect on incomes. The consensus emerging is that trade does matter, but that it is linked to the context in which it is placed. Institutions matter, as does infrastructure. Hence, the development agencies have focused on facilitation aspects of development assistance, and emphasis is again being placed on institution building. At the World Bank, for example, Freund and Bolaky (2004) stress the importance of labor and business regulation in the trade-growth mechanism, while Chang et al (2005) offer panel evidence that the broad domestic mix of policy, institutions, and infrastructure plays an important role in moderating the impact of trade.
In part, the pattern of export performance is linked to the political economy of policy reform, institutional development and colonial history, development assistance, and the general North-South dialog. We can develop analytical models linking all these factors. At a more basic level though, there is also a need to quantify the relative magnitudes involved in the interaction between trade, infrastructure, and institutions. This is the issue explored here.
We do have evidence that improvements in transportation services and infrastructure can lead to improvements in export performance. Limão and Venables (2001) show that infrastructure is quantitatively important in determining transport costs. They estimate that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked countries. Bougheas et al (1999) have analyzed the effects of infrastructure on trade through its influence on transport costs. Extending the DSF Ricardian trade model by endogenising transport costs and infrastructure formation their findings predict that for pairs of countries for which it is optimal to invest in infrastructure, a positive relationship between the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade takes place. Using a gravity model the authors provide evidence from European countries which supports the theoretical findings. Wilson et al (2004) have quantified the effects of trade facilitation by considering four aspects of trade facilitation effort: ports, customs, regulations, and e-business (which is a proxy for the service sectors of telecommunications and financial intermediation, which are key for all types of trade). The authors find that the scope and benefit of unilateral trade facilitation reforms are very large and that the gains fall disproportionately on exports. Levchenko (2004) suggests that differences in institutional quality can themselves be a source of comparative advantage, finding that institutional differences across countries are important determinants of trade patterns. Using a gravity model, Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) find that bilateral trade volumes are positively influenced by the trading countries' institutional quality. Ranjay and Lee (2003) look at a particular aspect of institutions-enforcement of contracts-and its impact on the volume of international trade. The authors construct a theoretical model to show how imperfect enforcement of contracts can reduce the volume of trade in goods for which quality issues are important. Using a gravity equation the paper incorporates proxies for the enforcement of contracts and finds that the measures of contract enforcement affect the volume of trade in both differentiated and homogeneous goods, but the impact is larger for differentiated goods. Also employing a gravity equation, Depken and Sonora (2005) estimate the effects of economic freedom on U.S. consumer exports and imports for the years 1999 and 2000. They find that better institutional quality of the partner country has a positive effect on the amount of exports from the U.S. to that country.
In this paper we examine the influence of infrastructure, institutional quality, colonial and geographic context, and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral trade. We are interested in threshold effects, and so emphasize those cases where bilateral country pairs do not actually trade. We depart from the institutions and infrastructure literature in this respect, using selection-based gravity modeling of trade flows. We also depart from this literature by mixing principal components (to condense our institutional and infrastructure measures) with a focus on deviations in the resulting indexes from expected values for given income cohorts to control for multicollinearity. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our dataset and the basic estimating framework. Results are discussed in Section 3, and conclusions offered in Section 4.
Methodology
When examining the global pattern of bilateral trade flows, one striking feature of the landscape is that many country pairs do not trade. In our sample 42% of importer-exporter pairings had zero bilateral trade. Thus, apart from analyzing the effects of different factors on worldwide trade, we also concentrate our attention on factors that may explain why trade does not occur at all. While some factors might be expected to be important in the decision on how much to import, the same factors may be differentially important when the trader decides whether he or she will import at all. And yet, these two decisions clearly are linked. Only if the trader decides to import can trade volumes be observed and hence examined. et al (2004) . 3 The distance data are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital cities.
We are ultimately interested in the dual role of institutions and infrastructure. Our gaps. A further complication is when tariff data are never reported for a country pair. In order to obtain an approximate tariff value applicable between these country pairs we then utilize the average applied tariff for the reporting countries for a given year. 3 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 4 http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html#efw (4) freedom to trade internationally: taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers, capital marke controls, difference between official exchange rate and black market rate, etc.; and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. Each index ranges from 0 to 10 reflecting the distribution of the underlying data. Notionally, a low value is bad, and a higher value is good. We work with indexes for 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2002, with in interpolated values for years without values.
To measure infrastructure, we have taken data from the World Development Indicators database. This includes data on the percentage of paved roads out of total roads, on the number of fixed and mobile telephone subscribers (per 1,000 people), on the number of telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people), on telephone mainlines in largest city (per 1,000 people), telephone mainlines per employee, mobile phones (per 1,000 people), and freight of air transport (million tons per km). Interpolation is used for years where no data are available.
Since both sets of indexes are highly correlated, we have used principal component analysis to produce a set of summary indexes. The results are reported in Table   1 . Ideally, principal component analysis identifies patterns in data and based on these patterns it reduces the number of dimensions of the data without a lot of loss of information. From the results in Table 1 , we take the first two components to produce four indexes; two institutional indexes, and two infrastructure indexes.
These reflect between 70 percent and 77 percent of variation in the sample. From the weighting factors in the table, we interpret the first infrastructure index as measuring communications, and the second the physical transport system. We interpret the first institutional index as measuring general correspondence with the market-oriented legal and institutional orientation flagged by the Fraser indexes (in a sense the correspondence to the Anglo-U.S. socioeconomic model). The second institutional index then measures less interventionist systems with lower taxes and more market friendly regulations (deviations toward the Anglo-US social model).
Estimating Equations
We work with Heckman's selection model (Heckman 1979 , Greene 2003 , where we estimate the probability of trade occuring jointly with the determinans of the level of trade using maximum likelihood methods. This is based on the following two latent variable sub-models:
where X is a k-vector of regressors, Z is an m-vector of regressors, and u 1 and u 2 are the error terms which are jointly normally distributed, independently of X and Z, with zero expectations. In specifying the underlying structure of equation (1) (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) . So do CES-based multi-sector models based on either firm or national product differentiation (Hertel 1997) . In formal terms, we start with CES preferences for imports defined over goods originating from r regions as in equation (3).
It follows immediately from first order conditions for a constrained optimization solution of (3) that import demand will be as defined by equation (4),
where σ = 1/(1 − φ). Similarly, under firm level differentiation (as in the ObstfeldRogoff implementation of Ethier-type production) and standard large-group and symmetry assumptions (Francois and Roland-Holst 1997) , with n r firms located in each of r regions and import demand specified over firm-based varieties, the CES aggregator can be written as in equation (5).
In equation (5), the term γ reflects a combination of CES weights and number of firms, aggregated by country, whilex i is the average quantity consumed from each firm in a region. The number will be fixed or given in a particular cross-section, as we are then working with an actual (particular) market outcome. Comparison of equations (3) and (5) should make it clear that in both cases we can work with equation (4). Starting with equation (4), if we take logs we have the following representation of import demand:
Defining the f ob price from country i as P * i , then the landed or cif price will then
In equation (7), the term τ represents trade taxes, while the term G represents factors linked to the cost of trade, such as administrative burdens, and also transport and communications costs linked to physical infrastructure and physical distance.
We can make a substitution of equation (7) into equation (6) to get a variation of the now standard 5 representation of the basic gravity equation with exporter and importer dummy variables:
In arriving at the final version of equation (8) Feenstra (2004) shows that including country-specific effects generates the same results as the Anderson and van Wincoop results with little loss of efficiency. Given our focus in the estimation on exporter-specific measures, we follow Feenstra, with modifications to allow for exporter variables as discussed in the text. flows as well.
Equation (8) is relatively general, and is used in much of the current literature.
This includes Mtys (1997) and Francois and Woerz (2006) . For our purposes though, we cannot use both fixed importer and exporter effects in our panel regressions. This is because we want to work with time-varying country-specific variables related to institutions and infrastructure, which precludes the use of time-varying country dummies. Instead, we include time specific and reporter (importer) country specific dummies. This forces us to include variables that are likely to be important determinants of the reduced-form exporter effects dummies in equation (8). From the gravity literature, we expect trade flows to be a function of importer and exporter size and income, as well as of determinants of bilateral trade costs like distance and tariffs. We also include variables of interest for the present exercise. These are measures of infrastructure and institutional aspects of importers and exporters that we expect to impact on trading costs. In terms of our sample selection model we specify the following: ln M i,j,t = α 0 + α 1 ln p pcGDP j,t + α 2 ln r pcGDP i,t + α 3 ln p P OP j,t (9) +α 4 ln r P OP i,t + α 5 T i,j,t + α 6 ln dist i,j + α 7 landlocked i α 8 comlang ethno i,j + α 9 colony i,j +α 10 ln IN F 1 j,t + α 11 ln IN S1 j,t + α 12 ln IN F 2 j,t +α 13 ln IN S2 j,t + u 1 and for the selection estimation we assume that M i,j,t is observed when we have β 0 + β 1 ln p pcGDP j,t + β 2 ln r pcGDP i,t + β 3 ln p P OP j,t
+β 4 ln r P OP i,t + β 5 ln dist i,j + β 6 landlocked i +β 7 comlang ethno i,j + β 8 colony i,j + β 9 ln IN F 1 j,t +β 10 ln IN S1 j,t + β 11 ln IN F 2 j,t + β 12 ln IN S2 j,t + u 1 > 0
In equations (9) and (10), u 1 and u 2 have correlation ρ. 6 Equation (9) assesses the determinants of the bilateral trade and shows the main factors influencing the amount of trade, given trade occurred between the two trading partners. Equation (10) sets out the selection criteria and provides information on the factors that determine whether or not we observe trade between country pairs.
All of our right-hand side variables are summarized in Table 2 . M i,j,t is country i imports from country j at time t. As a proxy for market potential, P OP is included for partner (exporter) and reporter countries, as well as per-capita income pcGDP . These are standard gravity variables, as is distance dist and tariffs T . For bilateral import protection, we use applied tariffs, lnT i,j,t = ln (1 + τ i,j,t ). Since both the factors proxying institutional quality of the partner country and the factors measuring the availability of infrastructure are highly correlated with income per capita and population, we regress our indexes against per-capita income and population and take the residuals as representative of deviations from incomeconditional expected values for each of the four indexes.
+e j,t , k = 1..4
These deviations e j,t then correspond to the index values in equations (9) and (10).
OLS estimates of equation (11) are reported in Table 3 . Both the first infrastructure variable, mapping to communications infrastructure, and the second variable capturing physical transportation are highly correlated with income. Roughly half of the variation in the institutional variables can be represented by income levels.
Results
Estimation results for variables of interest for the full sample and for sample splits are reported in Table 4 . In Table 4 we report marginal effects from ML-based
Heckman selection model regressions. Separate OLS estimates for equation (9) are reported in Table 5 and tobit estimates are reported in Table 6 . Focusing on the simultaneous ML-based estimates in Table 4 , for the full sample communications infrastructure (INF1 ) is significant with the expected sign. This holds both for the first equation (probability of trading or not) and for the second equation (the value of trade given that trade does occur). Again, there is a broad correspondence with priors. Transport infrastructure matters, and significantly, both for trade volumes, but also for the probability that trade occurs at all. The quality of general governance has a positive effect on both trade and the probability that trade occurs. Moreover, countries with lower degrees of government intervention in the economy have higher exports than otherwise. Again, this is not surprising.
We will focus shortly on the economic magnitudes of these effects. They are actually quite large.
In the remaining columns of the table, we turn to various splits on our full sample. What we are looking for is evidence of a differential role, at the margin, for institutions and infrastructure depending on the level of development. The second column of Table 4 focuses on South exports to the North, the third on LDC exports to the North, and the last on South-South trade. The exporters in the last three sets of results are therefore restricted to low and lower middle income countries according to World Bank definitions, and hence exclude high income countries. The importers exclude low and lower middle income countries in the second and third sets of results, high income in the fourth. For developing countries overall, the message is again that infrastructure matters. This applies not only to physical transportation, but also to communications infrastructure.
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General governance has a positive effect on trade, and a smaller presence by the state in the economy of the exporter does increase exports somewhat. However, the governance result changes somewhat for the poorest countries. We will explore this point further when we develop interaction terms. An important point to make at this juncture though is that relative to the average level for its income cohort, increased regulation and size of government improved performance for the least developed countries. This points to an undersupply of government services at the lowest income levels in the sample. This is further manifested when we turn to the South-South sample split, where we find that the involvement of the state in the economy has an ambiguous impact on trade. While it positively influences the probability of trading, it has a negative effect on the value of exports. We again get an unambiguous message about infrastructure though. It is a significant determinant of trade both for the probit results, and also for the trade volumes given that trade occurs.
If we move from statistical significance to economic relevance, what do our coefficient estimates tell us? We address this question in Table 7. The table reports To explore further the differences following from sample splits in Tables 4-7, in   Table 8 we report a full sample regression that includes an interaction term for each For this reason, in Figures 1 and 2 we plot estimated marginal effects (from the level and interaction terms in Table 8 ) from the coefficients reported in Table 8 , linked to variations in institutions and infrastructure. Given the underlying model, these marginal effects can be interpreted as variations relative to the mean value at a given income level. In other words, they quantify the observed improvement in export performance when a country has better transport infrastructure, for example, relative to other countries at the same income level.
From the figures, variations in basic transportation are much more important at low income levels in explaining variations in trade performance than at higher income levels. The opposite holds for communications, which grows increasingly important, particularly as a country reaches the middle income range. We also get a mixed message with institutions. While at high incomes a larger size of government, with greater regulation, is bad for exports, this is much less so at lower income levels. This is consistent with the North-LDC results from the split sample regressions reported in Table 4 .
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also report the regressions using other institutional variables from alternative sources, based on full sample specification in Table 4 . These measures are generally available for a shorter time span than our primary indicators, leading to a truncation of our panel. Corresponding results are shown in Table 9 . Instead of using principal component analysis we have included these institutional variables separately in the regressions. Since these variables are also correlated with income of the country we follow the previously used methodology and regress the institutional variables on per-capita income and population and take the residuals as representative of deviations from income-conditional expected values for each of the four indexes.
Alternative variables measuring institutional quality were obtained from two sources. Table 4 Heckman estimates * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. χ 2 (1) =16.00 χ 2 (1)= 9.68 Prob> χ 2 =0.0000
Prob> χ 2 = 0.0019 Marginal effects with std errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 9 Robustness checks govt. effectiveness 
=0.000
Source: own calculations. Marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
